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Introduction 
Rwanda, despite successful post-conflict 
economic growth, is an illiberal shell of a 
democracy as a result of unsuccessful post-
conflict democratization and liberalization. The 
2003 constitution calls for the “eradication of 
ethnic, regional and other divisions and 
promotion of national unity.”vii Peaceful 
elections have been held, but they merely 
provide the illusion of democracy. Any 
significant political threat to the regime is 
labeled a “divisionist” and legally barred from 
competition with Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, or RPF. The post-conflict path taken in 
Rwanda has resulted in the country’s slide 
towards authoritarianism. While some analysts 
argue that limitations on civil liberties, 
controlled political participation, and a closely 
monitored press are necessary in post-conflict 
environments to ensure stability in a post-
conflict state, by maintaining Rwanda as an 
exclusionary pseudodemocracy, the Rwandan 
elite are running a serious risk of inviting further 
acute violence in the future. 
 The 1994 Genocide and the associated 
collapse of the social order in Rwanda left a 
major impact on the state and its people. 
However, just as before the Genocide, the 
international aid community is currently 
praising Rwanda as a rare Central African 
success. All the numbers look good. Before 
taking into account the current global financial 
crisis, the Rwandan GDP was expected to grow  
 
 
 
 
 
 
some 5.5% in 2009, the 18th fastest in the 
world.viii Aid money is flowing smoothly into 
Rwanda, NGOs in part contributing to the 
continuation of authoritarianism while working 
in a difficult political environment. Between 
2005 and 2006, overseas developmental 
assistance (ODA) averaged “just over 14 
percent of GDP,” while FDI accounted for .23% 
and average savings accounted for -1.4% of 
GDP. ix A great deal of caution is necessary for 
the international donor community to avoid 
supporting and prolonging authoritarian rule. 
The international donor community must begin 
to make concrete demands of the Rwandan 
government to truly liberalize its political 
sphere, in the interest of continuing stability. 
 Rwanda offers a unique opportunity to 
apply post-conflict development theories. 
Fifteen years after genocide, the guilty and the 
innocent must continue to exist side-by-side in 
the same country and neighborhoods. 
Economically, it has rebounded fairly 
successfully. Politically, however, Rwanda is a 
far cry from a free, liberal democracy. A 
question that post-conflict specialists often face 
today is whether to focus on democracy in the 
form of elections, or on peace and stability. If 
liberalization takes a back seat to stability, how 
long can a ruling party continue to maintain a 
closed system before outsiders become 
radicalized, once again putting stability at risk? 
Is there a proper “sequence” for the building of 
a liberal democracy? Is there a trade-off 
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between democracy and stability? The case 
study of Rwanda involves the recovery from 
violence that reached an abhorrent extreme, and 
thus serves as a highly complex and very 
interesting test environment for the application 
of these current post-conflict theories and offers 
some answers for the questions they raise. This 
will also generate policy recommendations for 
the international community, NGOs, and 
policymakers in Kigali. 
Post-Conflict Democratization and the 
Democratic Peace 
 From the mid-1990s onward, elections 
were viewed as a major step towards success by 
policy-makers in post-conflict environments. 
For practical and logistical reasons, elections 
gave the statebuilding process a point where 
success could be claimed and the exit strategy 
could be pursued. In academia, this belief was 
not as widely accepted, but did gain a following. 
Elections became a major benchmark and 
indicator of the relative success of a given 
statebuilding mission. The acceptance of 
elections as a key part of post-conflict 
reconstruction was in part a result of the 
welcome adoption of Democratic Peace Theory 
by former U.S. President Bill Clinton.x  
Democratic Peace Theory holds that 
developed, liberal, or “consolidated” 
democracies do not engage one another in 
violent conflict. Applied to post-conflict 
development, this theory implied that if 
democracy and elections were made a priority 
objective, international peace would logically 
follow. Policymakers largely subscribed to this 
belief during the planning and carrying out of 
statebuilding operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.xi 
 This focus on elections delivering peace 
vis-à-vis the democratic peace was misplaced. 
While it may be true that consolidated 
democracies do not fight one another, the 
process of democratization is a rough and 
complex period, in which the risk of violence, 
both external and internal, actually increases 
significantly. Mansfield and Snyder noted that 
states going from full transition from complete 
authoritarianism to extensive mass democracy 
are “twice as likely to fight wars in the decade 
after democratization.”xii Subsequent work by 
Paul Collier delivers empirical evidence 
affirming the connection between 
democratization and internal conflict. According 
to Collier, “democracy, at least in the form it 
has usually taken to date in the societies of the 
bottom billion, does not seem to enhance the 
prospects of internal peace. On the contrary, it 
seems to increase proneness to political 
violence.”xiii  
A substantial argument emerged in the 
1990s that elections do not imply liberal 
democracy, and to believe otherwise is 
dangerous. As Fareed Zakaria wrote, “While it 
is easy to impose elections on a country, it is 
more difficult to push constitutional liberalism 
on a society. The process of genuine 
liberalization and democratization is gradual 
and long-term, in which an election is only one 
step.”xiv Lessons learned in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, both places where elections and 
violence exist side-by-side, lend credence to this 
viewpoint. The Democratic Peace Theory only 
applies to consolidated democracies, and 
therefore cannot be used to predict or 
understand the behavior of states undergoing the 
tumultuous process of post-conflict 
democratization. 
Democracy v. Stability 
Contemporary post-conflict development 
theorists largely acknowledge that democracy 
and elections are not equivalent and that the 
goals of democratization and those of peace 
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building and security enhancement may differ. 
Scholars such as Jack Snyder have firmly 
established that not “all good things go 
together” as once believed. Democratization and 
peacebuilding efforts can often have opposite, 
contrary, and even opposing goals and 
practices.xv For example, in a post-conflict 
situation where violence was very recently a 
legitimate means to air social grievances, the 
premature holding of elections may result in 
disappointed political losers returning to armed 
struggle, a case of democratization interfering 
with peacebuilding. Conversely, peacebuilding 
efforts intended to assuage potential spoilers 
such as inclusion of rebel groups in the 
democratization process can lead to difficult 
problems with the holding of democratic, free, 
and successful elections.xvi  
Benjamin Reilly notes the “security 
dilemma” which arises during elections after a 
period of violent conflict, whereby “competing 
ethnic, religious, and political actors will often 
mobilize against the possibility of future threats, 
triggering a cascading tit-for-tat escalation and 
polarization from other segments of society. In 
many cases, rising levels of internal conflict 
have accompanied or been precipitated by 
transitions from authoritarian rule toward 
democracy. Despite their essential role, post-
war elections have often fomented these 
tensions, becoming a lightning-rod for popular 
discontent and extremist sentiments.”xvii 
Therefore, a question of priority arises in 
post-conflict situations. Is it better to have 
democratic elections at the potential cost of 
peace, or should democracy be held off until a 
proper level of institutional support is in place? 
And what exactly does “democracy” mean in 
terms of concrete policy? If elections are not 
one-in-the-same with democracy and may 
actually be dangerous, then how can newly 
democratizing states move towards liberal 
democracy in a safe manner?  
Sequencing 
One answer is provided by the theory of 
sequencing. First made popular by Fareed 
Zakaria, Edward Mansfield, and Jack Snyder, 
sequencing does away with the viewpoint that 
immediate development of democratic elections 
is always a good thing, and instead proposes 
that national elections with universal suffrage 
should wait until the rule of law and a well-
functioning state is in place.xviii The sequencing 
strategy views democracy as a long-term goal to 
be strived for, not as something possible in the 
short-term. Mansfield and Snyder write, 
“Without reasonably effective civic institutions, 
the outcome in culturally diverse societies is 
likely to resemble Iraq and Lebanon. Once a 
country starts on an illiberal trajectory, ideas are 
unleashed and institutions are established that 
tend to continue propelling it along that 
trajectory. A key danger is that premature 
democratization will push a country down this 
path.”xix 
Sequencing theorists believe that the 
contestation and conflict of democratic elections 
can serve as a spark that relights the flame of 
violence in post-conflict societies. As violence 
was very recently the primary choice to address 
social grievances, a post-conflict state runs the 
risk of devolving into further chaos. If the 
original violence was ethnic in nature, early 
democratization can have particularly damaging 
consequences due to the process of 
“outbidding,” which occurs where political 
parties become extremely polarized, often on 
ethnic grounds. As one political party 
increasingly makes use of extremist rhetoric to 
compete for votes, opposing parties respond in 
kind, pushing both parties away from the center 
while cancelling out the moderate voices of the 
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political center. Intense polarization and 
othering causes a dramatic re-escalation of 
social tensions, which can often result in the 
breakdown of the democratic process and a 
return to violence.xx  
Sequencing is a logical answer to the 
failures of applying the democratic peace to 
newly democratizing states. However, it too is 
partially flawed. Responding to the early work 
done by Zakaria, Mansfield, and Snyder, 
Thomas Carothers argues that sequencing 
theory rests on a “mistaken two part premise: 
that a significant number of autocrats can and 
will act as generators of rule-of- law 
development and state-building, and that 
democratizing countries are inherently ill suited 
for these tasks.”xxi Carothers writes that the key 
failure of sequentialism is allowing 
authoritarianism to build democracy, a clearly 
problematic approach. Carothers views 
sequencing as an ideological practice of 
“kicking the can down the road” and delaying 
the development of free and fair elections 
indefinitely, as sequentialism provides no firm 
and clearly identifiable benchmarks for when a 
state is “ready” for democracy. Additionally, he 
is less pessimistic about the threat to stability 
which democracy brings.xxii  
Carothers also wrote that seqentialism 
would be used by “traditional realists” in order 
to excuse the maintenance of friendly relations 
with autocratic governments, by “traditional 
developmentalists” to re-ignite modernization 
theory’s view that development must precede 
democracy, and by “powerholders in some non-
democratic countries” to justify and excuse a 
closed political system by claiming such a 
situation is in the long-term interest of 
democracy. Carothers believes sequencing to be 
rooted in skepticism about democracy’s 
potential for success, rather than in hope.xxiii In 
response to sequencing, Carothers proposes a 
strategy he entitles “gradualism.” 
Gradualism 
 Gradualism insists upon holding 
elections, which are, for Carothers, the “core 
element” of democracy; in a manner that is 
“iterative and cumulative ways rather than all at 
once.”xxiv Where sequentialism puts off 
democratic elections until a stable rule of law is 
in place, gradualism encourages the incremental 
movement towards full and open elections while 
simultaneously undergoing state-building 
procedures. Carothers acknowledges the 
seemingly minute difference between the two 
strategies, but reaffirms the split between the 
two is “fundamental.” Gradualism encourages 
the taking of “incremental but definite steps” 
toward a fully open political arena while at the 
same time engaging in “statebuilding and rule of 
law reforms.”xxv  
Gradualism differs with sequentialism in 
that it calls for simultaneous development of 
state institutions and opening of the political 
system, as opposed to delaying the latter until 
the former has met some development 
benchmark. It is overall a more optimistic 
viewpoint on the democratization process. 
While sequentialism theorists are prone to 
characterizing democratization as inherently 
very unstable and potentially chaotic, 
gradualism sees the process as less sensitive and 
explosive after the initial transition phase. 
Gradualism does, however, agree with 
sequentialism in that “democratization has no 
natural place in the first phase, since this phase 
is usually a conflictive, coercive process carried 
out by strongmen leaders intent on conquest or 
militarized defense.”xxvi Thus, gradualism 
recognizes the need for some degree of delay 
after a major conflict before elements of 
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democracy can be introduced, but does not 
accept delay beyond a brief transitory period. 
The Dangers of “Elections = Democracy” 
There is a general acknowledgement 
within the post-conflict literature that the 
process of democratization can cause further 
violence in post-conflict settings. For 
proponents of democratic sequencing, elections 
are to be held off until a stable order and rule of 
law exists. For sequentialists, elements of full 
national elections, such as minor regional 
electoral contests, ought to be introduced 
gradually into a democratizing state. For both 
camps, full-suffrage free and fair elections tend 
to be portrayed as the “be all end all” of 
democratization efforts. This has led to a belief 
amongst policymakers and the broader 
international community that elections are the 
climax of post-conflict operations, and in 
international peacebuilding efforts, elections 
have often marked the successful completion of 
an operation.  
 However, as Anna K. Jarstad points out, 
“the first post-war election is often riddled with 
violence and flawed election outcomes.”xxvii For 
a multitude of reasons, including inadequate 
infrastructure, poor security services, and lack 
of democratic roots, the earliest elections in 
most post-conflict environments are a far cry 
from free and fair. Benjamin Reilly adds that, 
“…many transition elections are now saddled 
with unrealistic expectations to achieve goals 
that are inconsistent and incompatible. A more 
realistic and less ideological appraisal of 
elections is required – one which recognizes that 
elections can be potentially advantageous or 
injurious to post-war democratization – and that 
success is dependent on a careful consideration 
of timing, sequencing, mechanics, and 
administration issues.”xxviii 
 A further problem arises when 
considering the implications for the 
international aid regime. Writing on the topic of 
the development community’s work in Rwanda 
before and leading almost immediately up to the 
1994 Genocide, Peter Uvin explained the 
problem of developers hailing a state for sound 
economic policies and holding regular elections, 
while turning a blind eye to the actual political 
climate of the state.xxix If merely holding 
elections is the pre-requisite for receiving 
development assistance from the international 
community, the development enterprise is 
indirectly assisting in the spread of 
pseudodemocracy. Autocratic leaders can easily 
put on an election for show in order to satisfy 
international donors. When domestic elites 
realize that elections are the only thing being 
asked of them by the aid community, they will 
gladly supply them. However, those entrenched 
elites will often not go so far as to ensure these 
elections are free and fair or abide by electoral 
results. The international community must be 
more willing to tie aid to concrete reforms and 
liberalization of domestic politics. 
For these temporal and structural 
reasons, elections are surely a poor benchmark 
to determine the successful democratization of a 
post-conflict state that has only very recently 
escaped violence. A very serious danger to 
liberal democratization has arisen, bolstered by 
the international community’s willingness to 
view elections and democracy as tautological. 
What of the post-conflict state which, a decade 
or two after major violence has subsided, is now 
back on its proverbial feet, but the elite-in-
power refuse to give up their autocratic control? 
Realizing that the international community has 
seemingly equated democracy with elections, 
elites of such post-conflict states are offered the 
choice of instituting a pseudodemocracy, and 
illiberal democracies are born. 
5
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Illiberal Democracy 
 Fareed Zakaria coined the term “illiberal 
democracy” in a 1997 piece that appeared in 
Foreign Affairs. In this piece, Zakaria separates 
democracy from constitutional liberalism, and 
explains the danger of the first without the 
latter.xxx Simply put, democracy without 
liberalism is easily manipulated and controlled, 
ensures the public few if any basic rights, and 
features a tightly controlled political arena. 
The elite of illiberal democracies have 
realized that holding regular elections is an 
important social norm in the modern state 
system, and carries with it a certain amount of 
prestige. However, without the various 
freedoms that are guaranteed by liberal 
constitutionalism, the democratic process is 
easily corrupted by the state. As scholar Larry 
Diamond writes, “First, more regimes than ever 
before are adopting the form of electoral 
democracy, with regular, competitive, 
multiparty elections. Second, many of these 
regimes—indeed, an unprecedented proportion 
of the world’s countries—have the form of 
electoral democracy but fail to meet the 
substantive test, or do so only ambiguously.”xxxi 
Thus, illiberal democracies have all the window 
dressings that allow them to appear democratic 
in form, but a closer analysis will reveal their 
illiberal nature.  
Separating democracy from liberalism 
has proven an extremely important step in the 
process of categorizing and analyzing 
democratizing states. Analysts that have 
abandoned the fallacy that democracy alone is 
the pinnacle of development are more capable 
of rational assessment of the true political 
conditions within a state. Work by Larry 
Diamond, who uses the term “hybrid 
democracy” to carry the same meaning as 
Zakaria’s “illiberal democracy,” has used 
Zakaria’s ideas to shed light on the issue of 
classifying democratic regimes. He shows that 
“democracy” is not one static state of being, but 
instead, there is a scale of democracy, and 
regimes can land from “Liberal Democracy, in 
that they have a fairly liberal Freedom House 
score of 2.0 or lower on the seven-point scale 
averaging political rights and civil liberties” to 
“Politically Closed Authoritarian, which do not 
have any of the architecture of political 
competition and pluralism,” and anywhere in-
between.xxxii Such categorization has proven 
useful to post-conflict theorists in that they help 
theorists move beyond the ideological trappings 
that elections imply a democracy which can 
only be a positive development. 
Post-Conflict Democratization Theory and 
Illiberal “Slipping” 
In a post-conflict setting, the dangers of 
a regime slipping into the realm of illiberal 
democracy are particularly salient. Current post-
conflict theory advocates the delay of major 
elections until the state in question is capable of 
supporting elections peacefully. However, there 
is the ever-looming threat of authoritarian elite 
becoming entrenched, embracing the illusion of 
democracy in order to placate the international 
community while enacting domestic reforms at 
an excruciatingly slow pace, all the while citing 
the work of sequencing scholars and claiming 
the slow speed of reform is in the good interest 
of democracy.xxxiii 
As Carothers writes, “Prescribing the 
deferral of democracy—and consequently the 
prolongation of authoritarian rule—as a cure for 
the ills of prolonged authoritarianism makes 
little sense.”xxxiv Just as early elections can 
cause a democratization process to become 
abortive before it truly has a chance to succeed, 
putting democratic reforms on the back burner 
for too long can result in the development of a 
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democracy that has no roots in liberal 
constitutionalism. Instead, entrenched elites will 
utilize elections merely as a show for the benefit 
of its image to the international community and 
aid organizations. 
An Untouched Temporal Issue 
Sequentialism and gradualism raise a 
second important issue: how quickly must 
pressure be applied to post-conflict states in 
order to assure the growth of liberal democracy? 
Without offering any major concrete solutions 
of his own, Carothers does highlight a major 
flaw of the early sequentialism works in that 
they offer few universally applicable 
benchmarks for the beginning of full-suffrage 
elections in newly democratizing states.xxxv 
Post-conflict democratization becomes a 
balancing act, wherein the threat of excessively 
early elections must be cast against the problem 
of delaying elections indefinitely and potentially 
excusing autocratic rule, which does little to 
promote democratic development and may re-
ignite acute violence in the long run by 
preventing the airing of legitimate opposition 
grievances.  
Rwanda provides a unique environment 
upon which to apply the questions that linger 
unanswered in the post-conflict community. As 
the state suffered near-total collapse during the 
Rwandan Genocide of 1994, it certainly 
qualifies as a post-conflict setting. As the 
violence was of an ethnic nature, it can be 
expected that the post-conflict government 
would want to delay democratic reforms in the 
interest of state stability. Fifteen years after the 
Genocide, Rwanda certainly falls into the 
category of post-conflict states that have 
delayed true liberal democratic reforms and 
have witnessed “slipping” into the realm of 
democratic authoritarianism. Therefore, 
applying the questions presented by current 
post-conflict literature to Rwanda will uncover 
answers about the dilemmas that have arisen in 
that body of work. Splitting the Rwandan 
Recovery into four periods will allow for a more 
straightforward analysis and application of post-
conflict development questions of sequencing, 
order, and priority. 
Post-Colonial Rwanda: 1960 – 1994 
 In 1959-1960, a Hutu “revolution,” 
assisted by the Belgian colonizers, replaced the 
originally favored Tutsi monarchy with an 
independent republic dominated by southern 
Hutu. In 1973, Juvenal Habyarimana took 
power in a coup d’état and diverted power to the 
northern Hutu. Hundreds of thousands of Tutsi 
fled the country as refugees. During this era, the 
electoral politics of Rwanda became firmly 
established as an exercise of ethnic 
demography. The colonial interpretation of 
Rwandan politics as firmly Hutu/Tutsi in nature 
had taken hold.xxxvi 
 By 1990, the Tutsi population in exile 
had created a sizable rebel force, known as the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In late 1990, 
the RPF invaded Rwanda with initial military 
success. However, the Habyarimana regime 
received considerable international support, and 
the RPF shifted into guerilla-style combat, 
which it waged effectively. When locally 
arbitrated peace negotiation attempts failed, the 
United States, France, and the Organization of 
African Unity moved in to mediate an 
agreement between the Rwandan government 
and the RPF guerilla movement. 
 The Arusha talks lasted from July 1992 
through August 1993. The final document called 
for a cease-fire on both sides, inclusionary 
power sharing in a transitional government, the 
creation of nationally unified armed forces, and 
the return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs).xxxvii The implementation of the 
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Arusha Accords was anathema to the Rwandan 
Hutu elite and particularly to the Akazu, a group 
of powerful Hutu extremists. The elections 
called for in the Accords were clearly a threat to 
the entrenched order in Rwanda. The fear that 
the Accords would cause a dramatic change in 
the domestic political balance of power was one 
of many factors in the Akazu’s decision to turn 
to Genocide in order to protect Hutu extremist 
domination of Rwanda.xxxviii Such a fear of 
elections would continue to play a major role in 
Rwandan politics even after the Genocide was 
brought to an end. 
Rwanda: Early Post-Conflict Transition 1994-
2001 
 The post-conflict timeline in Rwanda 
begins immediately after the RPF disposed of 
the Hutu government responsible for carrying 
out the Genocide. The transitional government 
called for by the Arusha Accords was set up, 
with the RPF and its allies appointing the 
leadership. Elections were to be delayed until 
2003xxxix. The Tutsi-led RPF banned former 
President Juvenal Habyarimana’s party, the 
Mouvement Républicain National pour la 
Démocratie et le Développement, or MRNDD, 
and placed Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, into the 
office of the president, while Paul Kagame, who 
served as the head of the RPF’s military force, 
served in the role of Defense Minister. xl Mr. 
Kagame was believed to have a great deal of 
influence during Mr. Bizimungu’s tenure, and 
Kagame assumed power after Bizimungu was 
forced to resign following accusations of tax 
fraud.xli 
 Thus, in Rwanda, a transitional 
government was set up and full-suffrage 
elections were postponed for nine years. 
Decision-makers in post-conflict Kigali clearly 
chose stability rather than immediate 
democracy. Given the insights that post-conflict 
scholarship now provides on the dangers of 
immediate democratization efforts after a major 
conflict, especially when that conflict was 
ethnic in naturexlii, this was an understandable 
choice.  
If the Rwandan leadership had been 
pressured to make immediate moves towards 
democracy, the rise of political polarization on 
ethnic grounds would likely have been 
disastrous for the country and may have re-
ignited acute violence. A transitional period 
with elections scheduled a decent time in the 
future was clearly the safest method to help 
ensure peaceable democratization in Rwanda’s 
medium-to-long term. During the transitional 
period, the RPF, who largely controlled the 
transitional government, applied this theory to 
an extreme.  
The RPF Strategy: Sequentialism to an 
Extreme 
 In a 1995 interview, RPF leader and 
current President of Rwanda Paul Kagame 
outlined his views on the risk that early 
democratization would re-spark the ethnic 
violence that had torn Rwanda apart. His 
viewpoint is very similar to the post-conflict 
democratization experts who have written on the 
violent consequences of too-early 
democratizationxliii. 
If you try to organise elections, to 
authorise parties to grow like 
mushrooms and allow competition, you 
will be making an even bigger problem 
for yourself than the one you already 
have: dividing people who are already 
divided. What does the multi-party 
system mean in our African societies? 
That I will use every tactic to distinguish 
myself from my neighbour with the aim 
of winning more votes than he 
wins…you will never have a united 
country. We will never have democracy: 
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people will pounce on each other. One 
party would emerge to defend those who 
perpetrated the genocide, then another 
would arise saying that members of the 
former should be tried…You would 
have a great war. We must analyze the 
problems that are in store for us and 
those that we are going to solve.xliv 
 
Clearly, Kagame’s view of post-conflict 
development for Rwanda, which became very 
much the viewpoint of the RPF, is a version of 
extreme sequentialism. Explicitly, the RPF 
engaged in purposefully delaying the 
development of multi-party elections in order to 
ensure a peaceful transition period. Implicitly, 
however, the RPF manipulated this strategy in 
order to take advantage of the time afforded it to 
conduct grassroots campaigning operations so 
that it may continue its dominance of Rwandan 
politics when the transition period finally came 
to a close.xlv  Thus, an unintended consequence 
of sequentialism is discovered. Delaying the full 
opening of the political process until certain 
preconditions are met allows a party in power to 
take advantage of its superior placement in the 
political sphere to gather strength in a 
potentially unfair manner compared to lesser 
groups that may become legitimate opposition 
parties after the transition period has come to a 
close. 
Democratization Efforts prior to Constitutional 
Reform 
 As the end of the transitional 
government’s accepted tenure drew to a close, 
the transitional government began instituting 
some democratic measures. In early March of 
2001, local elections were held. These elections 
were considered by observers to be sloppily 
organized and of “Byzantine complexity,” 
which allowed “RPF placemen to exercise full 
control over the process.”xlvi As political parties 
were still banned from open operations in the 
Rwandan political sphere, all contestants in the 
election had to run without party support. 
However, as the RPF had unscrupulously taken 
advantage of the transitional, “party-free” period 
to campaign, they also implicitly supported 
candidates in these elections. A Human Rights 
Watch report on these early democratic 
elections considered this election “flawed from 
the beginning,”xlvii due to the unfair advantages 
taken by RPF party organizers, the purposeful 
delaying of international observers, and the lack 
of a secret ballot. 
The Constitutional Reform of 2001-2003 
 Despite this less than free and fair 
election, the Rwandan government began the 
process of drawing up a new, permanent 
constitution. The Constitutional Commission, 
which was provided for by the Arusha 
Agreement, was set up in late 2000 on the basis 
of law number 23, issued in late December of 
1999. The National Assembly of Transition 
(NAT) appointed the Commission’s president, 
Tito Rutaremara, in late November of 2000. The 
other members of the Commission had been 
appointed in July of 2000 by the NAT, resulting 
in the political composition of the Commission 
mirroring that of the NAT.xlviii The 
Commission’s objective was to provide 
proposals and eventually a draft of a permanent 
constitution to lawmakers in Kigali based upon 
consultations with the Rwandan public. The 
draft Constitution was then to be made into law 
through a national referendum, which was held 
on May 25, 2003 with an affirmative 
outcome.xlix 
However, doubts have been cast on the 
true effectiveness of the Commission in this 
regard. As the RPF-dominated Transitional 
Government was responsible for the education 
of the masses, they were able to easily 
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manipulate the Rwandan public into repeating to 
the Commission exactly what the RPF wanted 
to be emplaced in a new Constitution, a clear 
manipulation of the process.l 
The Rwandan Constitution of 2003 
establishes a unique set of rules for a system of 
government. Kagame and the RPF can certainly 
be praised for including direct universal suffrage 
and secret ballot elections. The “Burundi 
effect,” a name given to the ethnicity-based 
voting which took place in Burundi, caused 
Tutsi elite in the RPF to fear universal suffrage, 
as they was unsure of the party’s ability to 
attract rural Hutu votes. The fearful Tutsi elite 
added considerable pressure on the rest of the 
RPF to limit the electorate in order to assure its 
continued position in a place of power, but 
ultimately the decision was made in favor of 
full-suffrage voting.li Praise is also due the 
language that “ensures that women are granted 
at least thirty per cent of posts in decision 
making organs,”lii which has been sustained by a 
quota-based election sysem. 
However, as the constitutional reform 
process was all but dominated by the interests of 
the RPF, those interests are clearly and strongly 
reflected in the final product. The Rwandan 
Constitution of 2003 includes extremely strict 
guidelines for the activities of political parties as 
well as for individual politicians. While the 
Constitution explicitly allows a “multi-party 
system of government,”liii it also allows the 
national legislature to call any political party 
into question on various grounds of offensesliv 
and send the matter to the judiciary, which can 
decide the fate of the party. Party organization 
at the local level is prohibited, which prevents 
opposition movements from spreading 
nationwide.  
Critiquing the Constitutional Reform Process 
and Product 
 The constitutional reform process, which 
was heavily guided by the hand of the RPF, 
resulted in a document that was “tailor-made to 
legitimize the regime.”lv Just as the RPF took 
advantage of the transition period to conduct 
grassroots campaign operations, it took 
advantage of its position of power during the 
reform process to ensure the creation of a 
document that would be most capable of 
securing RPF rule in a potentially hostile 
electoral climate. Article 9 includes language 
that calls for “eradication of ethnic, regional and 
other divisions and promotion of national 
unity,” which can and has been used as a 
method of neutralizing the RPF’s political 
opposition.lvi The governing of political parties 
is exceptionally strict, and the divisionism 
language can be utilized by the RPF to deny the 
right to organize to any party that may pose a 
political threat. Here, we see another failing of 
waiting to begin major democratic reforms for 
too long. When the time for those reforms 
comes, the incumbent party-in-power can 
manipulate the process in order to serve their 
long-term goals, hijacking the process of 
democratization for its own ends. 
The Presidential Election of 2003 
Along with the new Constitution, 2003 
saw presidential and parliamentary elections 
held as well. The process and result of these 
elections helped to confirm Rwanda’s drift 
towards RPF-led authoritarianism.lvii The 
elections themselves were marred by political 
arrests, disappearances, and voter intimidation. 
International observers sent by the European 
Union witnessed cases of irregularities and 
fraud at 374 out of 10,000 voting stations 
visited. However, those international reporters 
found it was not fraudulent election day 
practices which secured an RPF victory, but 
rather it was the RPF using “its hold of the 
state’s administrative and military power to 
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exert various forms of influence on potential 
voters” which did so, a process that “started 
long before the electoral campaign.”lviii While 
the elections themselves were fairly clean, their 
results were the product of a campaign of voter 
intimidation carried out by the RPF. 
The results of the elections were 
lopsided. RPF leader Paul Kagame won the 
presidential contest with 95% of the vote, and 
the RPF took 74% of the legislature. Other 
minor parties had supported Kagame’s 
presidential run, and therefore represent allies in 
an RPF-dominated alliance.lix Thus, the 2003 
democratic elections resulted in a legitimization 
of the RPF rule that had dominated Rwandan 
political life since the end of the Genocide in 
1994.  
Rwanda 2003-Present: An Economic Success 
Slipping Towards Authoritarianism 
 Considering Rwanda’s status as a post-
Genocide state, the country has seen remarkable 
economic growth. Before the shockwaves of the 
global financial crisis began to impact Rwanda, 
the International Monetary Fund forecast it to 
witness 8.5% growth in 2008.lx According to a 
report from the United Nations Development 
Project, poverty rates remain high at 56.9%, but 
that figure is a marked decrease from the pre-
conflict figure of 70%. That same report credits 
Rwanda with the decline of infant mortality 
rates, an increase in primary school enrolment, 
and “significant progress in the area of peace 
and reconciliation, restoration of law and order, 
and democratization.”lxi 
 With such remarkable economic success, 
one would hope for an equal or greater success 
in the field of liberal democratization. 
Unfortunately, just the opposite has unfolded. 
The RPF has pursued a course of action that has 
systematically eliminated all credible 
opposition, all while still working within the 
legal confines of the 2003 Constitution and 
maintaining the façade of multi-party 
democracy. A 2003 report done by the African 
Capacity-Building foundation has found that 
“although the political discourse of the 
Rwandan authorities emphasizes reconciliation, 
national unity, and the respect for the rights for 
all, the government has been in the grip of a 
hazardous authoritarian drift.”lxii Since the 
passing of the 2003 constitution and the 
beginning of democratic elections, the RPF has 
maintained an increasingly tight hold on the 
political arena. Elections have not made the RPF 
more receptive to the demands of its electorate, 
but have instead required the RPF to tighten its 
grip in order to keep its hold on political power 
in the face of a potentially hostile electorate, as 
the Rwandan countryside is majority Hutu.lxiii  
 The Constitution that was designed by 
the RPF and for the RPF has served its function 
perfectly by providing legal methods that 
castrate and neutralize any significant 
opposition. A favorite tactic of the RPF to 
achieve this goal is through accusing the 
opposition of divisionism. The language 
allowing the calling into question of political 
parties is particularly devastating to the process 
of liberal democratization when combined with 
Article 9’s call for the “eradication of ethnic, 
regional and other divisions and promotion of 
national unity.”lxiv Part of the RPF democratic 
training literature included the official RPF 
doctrine on political parties, which includes that 
“the parties must avoid sowing the seeds of 
divisionism among Rwandans.”lxv  
 Thus, the RPF can easily do away with 
any potentially threatening opposition 
movements by claiming they are acting out of 
step with the government line towards a unified 
Rwanda and are therefore divisionist, seeking 
explicitly or implicitly to send Rwanda back 
into violent chaos. Pasteur Bizimungu, the 
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President of Rwanda during the 1994-2000 
period, launched his own opposition political 
party, the Party for Democracy and 
Regeneration (PDR) in 2001. The Rwandan 
government almost immediately banned the 
PDR on the grounds that it was “divisionist,” 
and Bizimungu was placed under house arrest, 
and later sentenced to a 15-year prison term.lxvi 
In the period of 1995-2003 alone, more than 40 
Rwandan political leaders have been forced into 
exile abroad. Former President Bizimungu 
remained imprisoned until 2007.lxvii As of mid-
2000, about 80% of the “most important office-
holders were RPF/RPA.”lxviii According to a 
2003 report from the International Crisis Group, 
in 2003, “11 out of 12 prefects are affiliated 
with the RPF, the chief prosecutor, head of the 
Court of Cassation and head of the 
Constitutional Court are all RPF members, 8 out 
of 9 Rwandan banks are managed by RPF 
members, and all the institutes of higher 
education are run by RPF members.”lxix 
  Under the guise of “national 
unity and security,”lxx the Rwandan government 
effectively prevents the formation of any 
legitimate and substantial political opposition 
from arising. Politicians, both inside the RPF 
and those members of other parties, are 
“expected to remain in the same political 
straightjacket.”lxxi While the 2003 Constitution 
calls for multi-party democracy, the RPF is able 
to circumvent this requirement by accusing 
opposition parties and politicians of 
“divisionism.” By doing so, the RPF is taking 
advantage of the unique nature of post-Genocide 
Rwanda. The excuse that any political 
opposition would snowball into a re-ignition of 
ethnic conflict is an illegitimate one for taking 
legal action and shutting down all opposition 
movements that may become politically 
threatening to the RPF in the future.  
The Subsequent Threat to Security 
 As Kristine Höglund wrote on the topic 
of violence in war-to-democracy transitions, 
“political violence is often a response to too 
little democracy.”lxxii By preventing opposing 
ideas from coalescing around legitimate and 
included political parties that are then allowed 
to participate in the process of governing, and 
by forcing opposition leaders into exile, the 
Rwandan government is dramatically increasing 
its security risk. The International Crisis Group 
found that the “excluded opponents generally 
try and find allies and fight against the 
government from the outside, thus increasing 
the security threat.”lxxiii The efforts of the RPF 
to monopolize its power and neutralize any 
opposition groups have the negative 
consequence of contributing numbers to an 
ever-growing group of radicalized Rwandan 
opposition-in-exile.  
 While much of the Rwandan Diaspora 
after the 1994 Genocide was believed to be 
comprised largely of Hutu genocidaires and 
moderate Hutus who feared Tutsi vengeance, 
more recent developments within Rwandan 
exile groups suggest a more diverse 
composition. Particularly telling is the creation 
of Tutsi-led exile groups in the United States 
and France who hold a “platform to fight against 
the RPF’s drift towards authoritarianism.”lxxiv 
The existence of Tutsi-led exile groups which 
hold such a platform certainly contribute more 
heavily to the argument that Rwanda has 
suffered such a drift than exile movements of 
purely Hutu composition. Many of these exile 
groups are of a bi-ethnic character, and therefore 
pose a problem to the RPF’s strategy of 
accusing opposition movements of divisionism 
on ethnic grounds.lxxv 
 There are still remnants of the extremist 
Hutu genocidaires organized and operating on 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s side of 
the border between Rwanda and that country, 
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and their presence has a destabilizing effect on 
peace in the region. However, there are also 
moderate Hutu and opposition Tutsi exile 
groups in the Great Lakes region that have 
categorically recognized the genocide and wish 
to bring about political reform in Rwandalxxvi. 
The longer the RPF-controlled Rwandan 
government prevents these groups from 
becoming part of the legitimate political process 
inside Rwanda, the greater the chance of these 
groups radicalizing, giving up on peaceable 
methods and turning to arms to achieve their 
objectives of political reform. The post-conflict 
literature recognizes the potential problems of 
inclusion regarding spoilers, but as Kristine 
Höglund writes, “inclusion in the political 
process based on commitments to peaceful 
means can be an important tool to prevent and 
manage violence.”lxxvii Should the RPF wish to 
work towards reducing Rwanda’s security risk, 
it must begin the process of including political 
groups which are willing to re-enter Rwandan 
society on a peaceful basis. 
A Muzzled Press 
 The organizers of the Rwandan 
Genocide were infamous for the use of hate 
media to polarize ethnic tensions, spread the 
message of genocide, and coordinate 
genocidaire squads. Radio stations, notably the 
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, or 
RTLM, were particularly effective in a country 
where literacy rates were staggeringly low, 
limiting the impact of written press.lxxviii The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has 
recognized the function of media in making the 
Genocide possible on such a massive scale, and 
has prosecuted three former RTLM figures. lxxix  
 Given this record of abuse, it may seem 
understandable that post-conflict Rwanda would 
be hesitant to allow much in the way of press 
freedoms. The excuse used by the Rwandan 
government runs along those exact lines – the 
fear of creating another “monster”lxxx means a 
clampdown on all media which shows a hint of 
independence from the official government line. 
The press law passed in 2001 decrees that “Any 
attempt, via the media, to incite a part of the 
Rwandan population to genocide, is liable to the 
death sentence.”lxxxi Just as the law that 
prohibits “divisionism,” this law is but another 
method of allowing the removal of opposition 
voices through legal means.  
 During the transitional phase, some 
independent press organizations had appeared 
which took the RPF and the Rwandan 
government to task on major issues. However, 
the state began a crusade of intimidation tactics 
that quickly put an end to this development. 
Owners and journalists connected to 
independent press outlets found themselves 
victim of state-sponsored harassment, 
intimidation, forced exile, and arbitrary 
detainment.lxxxii A more recent technique is the 
government’s insistence on a pre-requisite 
amount of start-up capital to allow the licensing 
of a new television station, radio station, or 
newspaper. These required amounts are high to 
the point of being prohibitive for the creation of 
any new media outlets.lxxxiii 
 The result of these laws is a highly 
obedient and non-confrontational national press. 
The media organizations that do exist have now 
learned to practice self-censorship” out of fear 
of being harassed, intimidated, attacked, or shut 
down by the state. According to an annual 
report written by the international press 
freedoms watchdog Reporters Sans Frontiers, 
one human rights worker “noted that it is more 
appropriate to refer to ‘government media’ than 
to ‘public media’.”lxxxiv During the 2003 
elections, the media was barred from covering 
elections at the provincial level and from 
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hosting televised debates between candidates, 
limiting their impact on the outcome.lxxxv 
A Final Application of Post-Conflict Literature 
 The RPF-dominated government of 
Rwanda has, since the end of the Genocide, 
acted in ways to ensure the continuation of its 
monopoly of power. Through the tactic of 
labeling all opposition voices both inside and 
outside of the political arena as “divisionist,” the 
Rwandan government has effectively managed 
to stifle any credible threat to its hold on the 
political process. Elections are a thinly veiled 
practice of legitimizing the RPF’s rule, done as 
a show of modernism and development for the 
enjoyment of the international community. 
Contemporary Rwanda can be included as one 
of Larry Diamond’s “Politically Closed 
Authoritarian” states without too much trouble 
for the classifier.lxxxvi Applying the post-conflict 
arguments to Rwanda allows us to understand 
those arguments more fully. 
 In the trade-off between democracy and 
stability, the Rwandan government clearly chose 
a focus on the latter during the transitional 
phase. Given the extraordinary and ethnic 
character of the violence witnessed in Rwanda, 
this was an understandable choice. In a nation 
that had just recently seen ethnic tensions 
polarized and exploited to a genocidal extent, 
the inherent conflict which democracy brings 
would have been too great a risk for transitional 
Rwanda. In a post-conflict society, elections 
must be held off until a point at which they 
would not re-ignite major acute violence.  
 This segues into the second major 
question in post-conflict democratization. To 
reiterate, if elections must be held off, when can 
they begin? An answer backed by Zakaria, 
Mansfield, and Snyder is that of 
“sequentialism,” wherein elections must be 
delayed until pre-conditions such as a stable 
rule-of-law is in place.lxxxvii A competing view, 
popularized by Thomas Carothers, is that of 
“gradualism,” where universal suffrage national 
elections should be delayed, but elements of 
democracy must be gradually instituted in a 
post-conflict society from the very beginnings 
of peace.lxxxviii 
 The case study of Rwanda strongly 
supports further application of Carothers’ theory 
of gradualism. The transitional Rwandan 
government used the basic ideas of 
sequentialism as a dodge and an excuse for its 
illiberal activities, insisting that it was working 
towards democratic reform while 
simultaneously abusing its power to ensure that 
when multi-party democracy became the policy 
of Rwanda, it would be nothing more than a 
façade designed to appeal to the demands of the 
international community while having no real 
impact on domestic Rwandan politics. 
In effect, sequentialism gave the RPF-
dominated transitional government a window of 
opportunity to abuse its position of power in 
order to campaign, canvass, and recruit 
members, all while other parties were prohibited 
to do so. Additionally, when the transitional 
phase drew to a close and the constitution-
building period began, the RPF manipulated the 
process to ensure the document would be 
“tailor-made”lxxxix to its interests and continued 
monopoly of power.  
If gradualism had been the dominant 
belief of post-conflict theorists and of the 
international community, there is a chance the 
policies of the transitional Rwandan government 
would have reflected that belief. If certain 
elements of democracy combined with gradual 
liberalization and statebuilding had been the 
norm for post-Genocide Rwanda, perhaps 
contemporary Rwanda wouldn’t suffer from a 
closed, authoritarian political system, while still 
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being able to manage the threat to internal 
stability which full-scale democracy can bring. 
Another issue raised by contemporary 
scholars of post-conflict societies is the danger 
of a generally perceived notion in the 
international community that elections are 
identical to democracy.xc The case of Rwanda 
clearly illustrates the pitfalls of such misguided 
thinking. Multi-party democracy is embedded in 
the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda and elections 
are regularly scheduled and conducted, leading 
the international community at large to assume 
Rwanda features a democratic character.  
The truth is that Rwandan elections are a 
façade, and the political process is heavily 
manipulated by the RPF to maintain its hold on 
power in the face of increasing opposition. The 
international community looks at Rwanda’s 
successful economic growth and democratic-on-
paper structure and green lights development aid 
projects, loans, and grants, effectively 
promoting the continuation of illiberal 
democracy in Rwanda. As Peter Uvin pointed 
out, a similar scenario existed during the years 
immediately prior to the outbreak of genocide. 
Thus, the view that democracy and elections are 
one-in-the-same is a mistaken and potentially 
fatally dangerous assumption.  
 Rwanda serves as a potent reminder to 
the community of post-conflict theorists and 
scholars that the temporal issue of 
democratization is far from unimportant. Post-
conflict democratization is clearly a balancing 
act between stability and democratic reforms. 
The danger of pursuing democratic elections too 
quickly after violent conflicts has been a hotly 
covered issue as of late, perhaps gaining such 
traction due to the faltering statebuilding efforts 
of United States foreign policy in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  
However, as the case of Rwanda clearly 
demonstrates, the other side of this balance must 
not be ignored. Should democratic reform be 
placed on the proverbial back burner for too 
long, post-conflict states run a serious risk of 
slipping into the realm of illiberal democracies. 
The theoretical argument that early 
democratization is a danger to stability is a 
positive contribution to post-conflict theory, but 
more care needs to be taken to ensure that 
autocratic leaders of post-conflict states are not 
allowed to utilize that argument as an excuse to 
delay the development of liberal democratic 
reforms indefinitely.  
Conclusion: Moving Forward  
 One of the most important contributions 
of the post-conflict literature has been that 
excessively early democratic reforms are 
potentially disastrous to the peace, stability, and 
security of a state that is just emerging from 
violent conflict, and thus elections should not be 
viewed as the primary indicator of progress in 
the process of reconstruction. As there is 
conflict inherent in any democratic elections, 
such elections should be held off until a society 
is more readily equipped to deal with that 
conflict in a way that is healthy and non-violent. 
However, as the early critics of this 
thinking have pointed out,xci the existence of a 
body of theory that calls for the delay of 
democratic elections is a potentially dangerous 
intellectual product. As the case study of 
Rwanda indicates, that theory can be taken to an 
extreme, used by authoritarian leaders to excuse 
their continuance of illiberal policies. While this 
is far from the intentions of the authors of recent 
post-conflict theory, it is certainly an accidental 
by-product that must be better guarded against 
in the future.  
There is clearly a great deal more work 
to be done in this highly relevant and relatively 
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new field of scholarly work. More attention 
must be called to the temporal and 
administrative questions of democratization in 
post-conflict societies, and additional thorough 
analysis will help to better identify the right 
balance between the delay of universal suffrage 
national elections and the risk of slipping into 
the realm of pseudodemocracy. 
 For Rwanda, it is time for the 
international community to place additional 
pressure on the government to liberalize the 
political process. The ruling party is 
manipulating and taking advantage of the 
country’s past in order to stifle opposition 
parties and muzzle the Rwandan free press. 
While such tactics may be in the short-term 
interest of the RPF, they create a very real 
danger for the country in the long-term. By 
undermining the growth of legitimate domestic 
opposition groups, the Rwandan government is 
running the risk of radicalizing the 
opposition.xcii As violence is still relatively 
recent in Rwanda’s history, it is not unthinkable 
that such a radicalized opposition, after having 
been driven underground, would turn to violent 
means in order to bring about the political 
change they desire. 
 Policymakers in Kigali need to 
understand the risk of continuing along such 
illiberal trends in a post-conflict state. A violent 
society has an increased risk of returning to 
violence.xciii While opening up the political 
sphere may seem like an unattractive and 
difficult option for such a dramatically 
entrenched party, it will help reduce the risk that 
is currently building in Rwanda. Successful 
economic developmental statistics such as those 
associated with Rwanda may cast a light of 
doubt on such a grim prediction, but observers 
must remember that Rwanda was in the good 
favor of development specialists immediately 
prior to the 1994 genocide as well.xciv 
 A presidential election is scheduled for 
2010, as per the Constitution, which calls for 
them once every seven years.xcv President 
Kagame may run for a second term in these 
elections, but, barring any alteration of the 
constitution or Putin-style “sidestepping,” his 
second term must be his last. The results of this 
election will serve as an excellent barometer as 
to the status of Rwanda. Should we see a repeat 
of the 2003 elections, wherein Kagame won a 
staggering 95% of the vote and the work of 
international monitors was made exceedingly 
difficult, it will be clear that little political 
progress has been made, and Rwanda will still 
be categorized as “Politically Closed 
Authoritarian.”xcvi' 
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